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THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE; ITS APPLICABILITY TO
PROSECUTIONS FOR SPEEDING VIOLATIONS
The "presumption of innocence", although
the term may be of doubtful meaning,' is a
keystone in the American theory of criminal
law.' The principle that an accused is presumed
innocent until proved guilty beyond a reason-
able doubt is applied in all criminal cases,3 both
misdemeanor and felony, 4 and has also been
I Most commentators contend that "presumption
of innocence" is a misnomer, because it is not based
on any logical inference. See Chaffe, The Progress
of Ike Law, 35 HAmv. L. REv. 302, 315 (1922).
("There is no probability that the man indicted by
grand jury is innocent").
The use of the term "presumption of innocence"
has further been criticized as being a fiction and
only another way of stating that the burden of proof
is on the prosecution. See 9 WIGMoRE, EvDENcE
§ 2511 (3rd ed. 1940).
However, although the term may be only a
fiction, courts still recognize the presumption of
innocence as having meaning, and for purposes of
this article it will be treated in the manner in which
it is considered in the majority of jurisdictions.
2 UNDER=, CRnMNAL EVIDENCE § 41 (4th
ed. 1935).
' Hammond v. United States, 127 F.2d 752, 753
(D.C. Cir. 1942) (Attempted rape); United States v.
Abda, 32 F. Supp. 23, 25 (M.D.Pa. 1940) (Sale of
rubbing alcohol to drink); Turner v. State, 238
Ala. 352, 355, 191 So. 396, 398 (1939) (Assault with
intent to commit murder); Hawes v. State, 88
Ala. 37, 72, 7 So. 302, 314 (1890) (Murder); State
v. Lutz, 113 N.E.2d 757, 761 (Ohio 1953) (Assault
and battery).
I United States v. Commercial Creamery Co.,
43 F. Supp. 714, 715 (E.D. Wash. 1942) (Shipping
rotten eggs in interstate commerce in violation of
Federal Food, Drug and Cosmetic Act); Vandwenter
applied in cases involving traffic violations. 5
There appears to be a uniformity in the effect
of this presumption, whether it is created by
statute, or exists merely by force of the common
law.6
v. State, 38 Neb. 592, 595, 57 N.W. 397, 398 (1894)
(Assault and battery-here classed as a misde-
meanor); Fuller v. State, 12 Ohio St. 433,434 (1861)
(Selling liquor in violation of state law. ". . . [Min
all cases where a party stands charged with a crime
or offense, his innocence is presumed, andss a
burden of proof is on the prosecutor, unle the
different rule has been expressly provided by
statutes.") (Emphasis added).
Proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is also
required in trials for misdemeanors. Wasden v.
State, 18 Ga. 264 (1855) (Adultery and fornication.
The trial court was reversed for qualifying its
instruction as to reasonable doubt by adding that
in lesser grades of offenses such as misdemeanors
the rule was somewhat relaxed); Stewart v. State,
44 Ind. 237 (1873) (Selling liquor in violation of
state law. ".... [11n criminal and misdemeanor cases,
the evidence must be beyond a reasonable doubt to
support a conviction".); Sowder v. Common-
wealth, 71 Ky. (8 Bush) 432 (1871).
5McCarthy v. Cincinnati, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
362 (1928) (conviction for parking violation
reversed, correspondence between the license
number of the ticketed car and the license number
issued to the defendant held insufficient to over-
come the presumption of innocence).
See also Burke v. Cincinnati, 27 Ohio N.P. (n.s.)
589 (1930) (Distinguished from McCarthy case,
supra, in that here ownership of the ticketed car
was admitted).
6 "The presumption of innocence is founded upon
the first principles of justice; it is the same pre-
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In its application the presumption has been
variously interpreted. In 1895 the Supreme
Court of the United States held that the pre-
sumption was evidence in favor of the accused,
remaining with him throughout his trial, and
was to be weighed with the other evidence in
the jury's deliberations This view was later
repudiated; the Supreme Court s and the major-
ity of the state courts9 now adhere to the rule
sumption of law which obtained in behalf of the
accused at common law". Monaghan v. State, 10
Okla. Crim. 89,97,134Pac. 77,80 (1913); Culpepper
v. State, 4 Okla. Crim. 103, 111 Pac. 679 (1910).
7 "This presumption on the one hand, supple-
mented by any other evidence he (defendant) may
adduce, and the evidence against him on the other,
constitute the elements from which the legal
conclusion of his guilt or innocence is drawn."
Coffin v. United States, 156 U.S. 432, 459 (1895)."
8Holt v. United States, 218 U.S. 245 (1910);
Agnew v. United States, 165 U.S. 36 (1897).
In Agtww v. United States the Court sustained the
trial court's giving an instruction that the prO-
sumption remains with the defendant until such
time when the jury is satisfied of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt, instead of the requested in-
struction that the presumption of *finocence was'to
be regarded as evidence by the jury. Id. at 51.
In Holt v. United States, citing the Age-, case,
this view was made more explicit when the Court
approved the trial court's refusal to instruct that
the presumption was evidence in the accused's
favor, and its instructing that "the evidence must
overcome the legal presumption of innocence".
(Emphasis added). Id. at 253.
See also Nimerick v. United States, 118 F.2d 464
(2d Cir. 1941) (held not error to refuse instruction
that presumption was evidence in defendant's
favor).
See also 9 WiGMoRE, EvmiENc § 2511, at 407
(3d ed. 1940) ("But this term has been subjected
to two special fallacies, namely..., and, 2, that it
is per se evidence"). I
While on the surface there may be little differefice
in these two views, under the view of the 'Coffin
case, supra note 7, a jufy is allowed to regard the
presumption of innocence as having' probative
force and to treat it as affirmative testimony for
the accused.
9 State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895
(1941); Broadnax v. State, 57 So.2d 651 (Fla.
1952); Brock v. State, 91 Ga. App. 141, 85 S.E.2d
that the presumption compels the prosecution
to assume the burden of proving guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt 10 and that when this burden
is met the presumption is removed from the
case. It is well established that direct evidence
proving beyond reasonable doubt all the essen-
tial elements of the crime charged will overcome
the presumption." However, when the prose-
177 (1954); People v. Isonhart, 259 Ill. App. 9
(1930); State V. Linhoff, 121 Iowa 632, 97 N.W. 77
(1903); Commonwealth v. Powers, 294 Mass. 59,
200 N.Y. 562 (1936); Warner v. State, 75 So.2d
741 (Miss. 1954); State ex rel. Detroit Fire and
Marine Insurance Co. v. Ellison, 268 Mo. 239, 187
S.W. 23 (1916); State v. Kilcoyne, 82 N.H. 432,
135 Atl. 532 (1926); State v. Cephus, 239 N.C. 521,
80 S.E.2d 147 (1954); Culpepper v. State, 4 Okla.
Crim. 103, 111 Pac. 679 (1910); Commonwealth v.
Russogulo, 263 Pa. 93, 106 Atl. 180 (1919); State v.
Quigley, 26 R.I. 263, 58 Atl. 905 (1904); State v.
Steadman, 70 Utah 224, 259 Pac. 326 (1927);
State v. Demag, 118 Vt. 273, 108 A.2d 390 (1954);
State v. Reppert, 132 W.Va. 675, 52 S.E.2d 820
(1949).
However, some states still hold that the pre-
sumption of innocence is to be regarded as a matter
of evidence. Perry v. State, 37 Ala. App. 683, 74
So:2d 619 (1954); Alford v. Bello, 130 Cal. App. 2d
291, 278 P.2d 962 (1955); State v. Bubis, 39 Idaho
376, 227 Padc. "384 (1924); State v. Gilbert, 125
Mont." 104, 232 P.2d 338 (1951); Behrens y. State,
140 Neb. 671, 1 N.W.2d 289 (1941); Smith v.
Commonwealth, 92 Va. 186, 64 S.E.2d 761 (1051).
S1°Whiat constitutes proof "b~y6nd reasonible
doubt" has also been surrounded by much confusion.
A reasonabie "doubthas been defiiied'as being such
a doubt a reasonable nian might entertain after a
fair review and consideration of the evidence-a
doubt-for which'some'good reason arising from the
evidence can be given. People v. Guidici, 100 N.Y.
503, 3 N.E. 493 (1885).'
However even this definition might tend to
confuse the juror. Probably 6ne of the most acxurate
and coiicise definitions of'proof beyond reasonabl
doubt is'that which amounts to a moral certainty
as 6pposed to an absolute certainty. Commonwealth
v. Costly, 118 Mass. 1, 24 (1875).
" Sauls v. State, 29 Ala. 587, 588, 199 So> 254
(1940Y; People v. Hurley, 13 Cal. App. 2d 208,
213, 56 P.2a 978, 981 (1936); RvIers'v. State, 140
Fla. 487,489, 192 So. 190, 191 (1939); Huntsinger'v.
State, 200 Ga. 127, 139, 36 S.E.2d 92, 100 (1946);
19561
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cution seeks to overcome the presumption
through the use of circumstantial evidence the
problem becomes more difficult.12 Since circum-
stantial evidence is by definition admissible
and probative evidence, 3 it should be sufficient
to negate the force of the presumption. It would
follow, therefore, that a presumption of fact,
14
which arises when circumstantial evidence is of
People v. Bagwell, 295 Mich. 412, 419, 295 N.W.
207, 210 (1941); State v. Fitch, 162 S.W.2d 327,
330 (Mo. 1942); Commonwealth v. Marmo, 137
Pa. Super. 467, 468, 9 A.2d 181 (1939); Blankenship
v. State, 131 Tex. Crim. 146, 147, 97 S.W.2d 475
(1936); Abdell v. Commonwealth, 173 Va. 458, 470,
2 S.E.2d 293, 298 (1939).
12 Considerable confusion has surrounded the test
for the sufficiency of circumstantial evidence. The
traditional test has been that the prosecution has
to prove that all circumstances are inconsistent
with any reasonable hypothesis of the accused's
innocence. Cristian v. State, 228 Ind. 30, 89
N.E.2d 445 (1950); Commonwealth v. Shea, 324
Mass. 710, 88 N.E.2d 645 (1949); People v. Asta,
337 Mich. 590, 60 N.W.2d 472 (1953). However, it
has been strongly urged that a stricter test should
not be used for the sufficiency of circumstantial
evidence than used for the sufficiency of direct
evidence, i.e., proof beyond reasonable doubt of all
the essential elements of the crime charged. This
controversy has yet to be resolved, but recently the
United States Supreme Court in Holland v. United
States, 348 U.S. 121 (1954) held that it is un-
necessary and even improper to charge the jury in
terms of the reasonable hypothesis test. For a
comprehensive article on this controversy see Note,
55 CoLur. L. REv. 549 (1955).
3 "The only difference between positive and
circumstantial evidence is, that the former is more
immediate, and has fewer links in the chain of
connection between the premises and conclusion.
... All evidence is more or less circumstantial, the
difference being only in the degree.... But the law
exacts a conviction whenever there is legal evidence
to show the prisoner's guilt beyond reasonable
doubt; and circumstantial evidence is legal evi-
dence." Commonwealth v. Harman, 4 Pa. 469
(1846).
14 A presumption of fact is defined as a logical or
natural inference of one fact from another. MODEL
CODE OF EviDENcE, Forward (Morgan) 52 (1942).
sufficient probative force,15 will also suffice to
rebut the presumption of innocence. A presump-
tion of law16 arising from a proved fact, per-
mitting the judge to instruct the jury to find
according to that presumption in the absence of
any counterproof will, a fortiori, rebut the
presumption. The problem of rebutting the
presumption of innocence through the use of
such a counter presumption of law arose in a
recent New York case involving a traffic vio-
lation.
In People v. Hildebrandt," the defendant was
convicted of speeding. An automobile had been
photographed by two cameras and the distance
traveled in the time that elapsed between the
two photographs was computed by the police
to determine the speed of the car. Although the
driver was not identified in the pictures, by
checking the license number through the regis-
tration bureau, the police established that the
defendant was the owner. The defendant re-
ceived no notice that he had been charged with
the offense until two weeks later, 8 when he was
15 Where antecedent experience shows the con-
nection between an ascertained fact and a fact
otherwise undetermined to be constant or greatly
uniform, the inference deducible is properly termed
a presumption. Stevenson v. Stewart, 11 Pa. 307,
308 (1849).
10 Presumptions of law are artificial presumptions
created by law whereby one fact is presumed to
exist if another fact is proved, although the fact
proved is not in itself direct evidence of the pre-
sumed fact. Such presumptions are created because
of a customary or probable relationship between the
proved and the presumed fact, or because of a rule
of convenience or public policy. See Comment,
Illinois Presumptions and the Uniform Rules of
Evidence, 49 Nw. U.L. REv. 657, 658 (1954).
17 308 N.Y. 397, 126 N.E.2d 377 (1955).
'8 A point raised by the defense on appeal to
the county court was that his constitutional rights
were violated by the delay in notifying him of the
charge. The county court dismissed that objection,
saying that, while the defendant may well have
been placed at a disadvantage, especially in view
of the manner in which the evidence was obtained,
the delay did not violate the statute of limitations.
Hence it could not rule as a matter of law that the
delay was sufficient ground for reversing the con-
[Vol. 47
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summoned to appear before the justice of the
peace court, at which time he entered a plea of
not guilty. At the hearing there was no direct
evidence as to who had been driving the car;
the only proof on this issue was that the accused
was the licensed and registered owner. In order
to find the defendant guilty, the justice of the
peace presumed that the defendant owner was
operating the car at the time of the alleged vio-
lation.19 On appeal the conviction was sustained
by the county court which relied on the ruling
in People v. Rubinl, 20 to the effect that in prose-
cutions for parking violations there is a rebut-
table presumption that the owner was the
operator.
The defendant then appealed to the New
York Court of Appeals, where he did not contest
the admissibility or accuracy of the evidence or
dispute the fact that he was the owner of the
car; instead he relied solely upon the proposition
that mere proof of ownership was insufficient
to support the presumption that he, specifically,
had been the driver. The Court reversed and,
in a four to three decision, held that neither a
presumption nor an inference,21 of the driver's
viction. The court did acknowledge, however, that
there should be no unnecessary delay in bringing
such violations to the attention of the accused.
People v. Hildebrandt, 204 Misc. 1116, 129 N.Y.S.2d
48 (County Ct. 1954).
19 Such a presumption has been enacted into law
in some states. See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 1039 (c)
(Supp. 1953); PA. STAT. ANNa. tit. 75, § 739 (1953).
But see CAL. VEH. CODE ANNOTATIONs § 591
(Supp. 1955) (Expressly stating that this section
shall apply only to parking violations).
20 284 N.Y. 392, 31 N.E.2d 501 (1940).
21 Courts generally are very lax in drawing a
distinction between the meanings of these two
words. Legal writers, however, define an inference
as being a permissible deduction of the existence of
a certain fact which arises as a reasonable proba-
bility from a proven fact. See 9 WiGmoRE, EVmENcE
§ 2487 at 281 (3d ed. 1940). A presumption is
generally regarded by legal writers as being a rule
of law laid down by the court, arbitrarily attaching
to a proven fact sufficient weight so that the party
against whom the rule operates will lose as a matter
of law, if counter-proof is not produced. See 9
,VIGuORE, EvIDENcE § 2491 (3d ed. 1940).
identity could arise from mere proof of owner-
ship in a case involving a moving violation.22
The dissent based its opinion on the validity
of the inference of operation, public policy and
convenience, and a respect for the precedent of
People v. Ritbiml.
A preliminary question in this case is whether
the presumption of innocence is applicable to
traffic violations. Cases involving traffic viola-
tions are generally termed "offenses," "viola-
tions," or "infractions."' ' Since such a charge
might not rise to the level of a misdemeanor or
felony, it could be argued that the accused was
not entitled to the protection of this presump-
tion.25 In the Hildebrandt case, however, this
22 This seems inconsistent with a statement made
in People v. Rubin, 284 N.Y. at 396, 31 N.E.2d at
502, that, "To rule that this inference may not be
drawn from the established facts would be to deny
to the trier of facts the right to use a common
process of reasoning."
23 The dissent stressed four points in arguing for
affirmance of the conviction: (1) that ownership of
a car does furnish a basis for an inference, supported
by reason and logic, that the owner was the driver
of the car; (2) that the practical ends of justice
should not be hampered by rendering less effective
the mechanical aids for traffic control; (3) that
since the facts were peculiarly within the de-
fendant's knowledge, it did not prejudice him in any
way to impose the burden of offering evidence to
rebut the presumption of operation; and (4) that
this case was not distinguishable from People v.
Rubin, and that it is as logical to presume that the
owner is at the wheel of his car when it is speeding
as when it is being parked.
2 E.g., CoLo. STAT. ANN. c. 16, § 159 (1935)
(offenses); N.Y. VEHICLE AND TRATFIc LAW § 2,
subd. 29 (1952) (infractions).
2
5 As indicated in Fuller v. State, 12 Ohio St.
433, 434 (1861), the presumption of innocence might
not always be available -to the accused in lesser
offenses, when the presumption is abolished by
statute. The view that the accused in speeding
violations might not be entitled to the protection
of the presumption is further supported by the fact
that the explicit constitutional guaranty of trial
by jury is denied to traffic violators in New York.
N.Y. VEHICLE AND TPAPmrc LAW § 2, subd. 29
(1952).
1956]
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question was moot because of two New York
statutes: the first making vehicular violations
misdemeanors; the second extending to persons
accused of such violations the same procedural
safeguards as are available in a criminal case
while, at the same time, declaring that such
violations are not crimes.
26
28 One of these statutes is an act enabling the
New York State Thruway Authority to:
promulgate rules and regulations with
respect to the throughway: Such rules and
regulations shall relate to vehicular speeds...
and such other matters as may be deemed
necessary and proper to regulate traffic in the
interest of safety, the maximum convenience
using the thruway.... Violations of such rules
and regulations shall be a misdemeanor
punishable by a fine of not exceeding fifty
dollars or by imprisonment for not more than
thirty days or both. N.Y. PUBLIc AuTnoRITrEs
LAW § 361, subd. 1 (1950).
Since speeding is a violation of these rules, the
defendant would be afforded the safeguards of the
presumption.
The other statute provides that a traffic infraction
is a violation of any traffic law where a penalty is
imposed, but it is not a crime, and the penalty
imposed should not be deemed a criminal punish-
ment. A conviction of such an infraction is not to
impair that person's credibility as a witness or for
any other purpose. Courts that had jurisdiction
over such violations when they were deemed mis-
demeanors are to continue to exercise jurisdiction
over traffic infractions, and "all provisions of law
relating to misdemeanors" shall apply to these
infractions. N.Y. VEmCLE AND TRAFFIc LAW § 2,
subd. 29 (1952).
While a detailed discussion of whether the
presumption of innocence could technically come
under the phrase "all provisions of law relating to
misdemeanors" is beyond the scope of this article,
it is probable that the purpose of this statute is to
reduce traffic. violations from the rank. of misde-
meanors, and thereby protect those convicted of
traffic violations from having criminal records, but
to retain the traditional safeguards afforded persons
accused of more serious crimes. Under this analysis
the above phrase should be interpreted as "all
provisions of law and all procedural safeguards
relating to misdemeanors... shall apply to traffic
infractions." This appears to be the interpretation
applied by the court in construing this statute. E.g.,
Applications of Gross, 284 App. Div. 786, 135
Although moot in the Hildebrandt case, this
question may present a more serious problem
in other jurisdictions. In those states which
expressly classify speeding as a misdemeanor,2
the accused should be granted the benefit of the
presumption.w In addition, all states prescribe
that violations of speeding regulations shall be
punishable by a fine, a short jail sentence, or
both, and therefore such violations should be
classified as misdemeanors, at least for the pur-
pose of applying procedural safeguards includ-
ing the presumption of innocence2
N.Y.S.2d 435 (3d Dep't. 1954) (even though
charge is a traffic violation, not a crime, procedural
requirements relating to misdemeanors apply).
While these two statutes may appear inconsistent
in that the first states that speeding is a misde-
meanor and the second says that it is only an
infraction, the former applies only to violations of
regulations promulgated by the Thruway Authority,
and the latter applies to violations of any regula-
tions, state or local law or city ordinance.
27 E.g., ALA. CODE tit. 36, § 5(2) (1953 Supp.);
CAL. VEI. CODE Am. § 760 (1948); CoLo. STAT.
ANN. c. 16, § 159 (1935); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 21,
§ 4155 (1953); GA. CODE ANN. § 68-9908 (1933);
ILL. AN. STAT. c. 95Y2, § 234 (1950); IOWA CODE
ANN. § 321.482 (1949); KAN. GEN. STAT. § 8-5,
125 (1949); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 20-176 (1951);
VA. CODE § 46-18 (1950).
28 See note 4 supra.
29 The definition of a misdemeanor, while largely
statutory, usually does not require a minimum
penalty, and generally includes offenses less severe
than felonies which are punishable by fine or
imprisonment otherwise than in a penitentiary.
E.g., United States v. Stevenson, 215 U.S. 190
(1909); People v. Pointer, 348 Il. 277, 180 N.E.
796 (1932). It is also generally accepted that the
penalty determines the classification of the offence.
People ex rd. Cooley v. Wilder, 234 App. Div. 256,
255 N.Y. Supp. 218 (4th Dep't. 1932).
Since the punishment for a speeding violation,
especially in those states which impose harsher
penalties for each successive traffic violation within
a specified period, or even revocation of the opera-
tors' license, is as great or even greater than the
punishment in many misdemeanors, it would be
adhering to form without substance to deny an
accused the procedural protection of requiring the
state to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
[Vol. 47
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I Concluding that the presumption of inno-
cence was properly applied in the Hildebrandt
case does not, however, automatically lead to
the conclusion that the Court of Appeals should
have reversed the conviction. Hildebrandt was
properly convicted and the presumption of in-
nocence overcome if a presumption of operation
could be invoked here. The principles under-
lying the creation of a presumption, such as a
presumption of operation, have been examined
by Professor Morgan. He recognized six differ-
ent reasons for creating a presumption, two of
which are involved in the Hildebrandt case:
presumptions based on the preponderance of
probability and presumptions created because
of the comparative convenience of producing
evidence.30 Morgan added that most of the gen-
merely because a speeding violation is not expressly
defined as a "misdemeanor" or a "felony".
Furthermore, offenses involving an analogous
amount of improbity have been classed as mis-
demeanors. Taylor v. United States, 142 F.2d 808
(9th -Cir. 1944) (violation of rent regulations);
McLean v. State, 16 Ala. App. 196, 76 So. 480
(1917) (vagrancy-evidence must show guilt
beyond reasonable doubt); Douglass v. Smith, 66
Fla. 460, 63 So. 844 (1913) (violation of fish and
game laws); Madron v. McCoy, 63 Idaho 703, 126
P.2d 566 (1942) (failure of truck driver to signal
intended change in course); People v. Katz, 284
N.Y. 244, 49 N.E.2d 482 (1943) (simple assault);
State v. Orton, 145 Wash. 289, 259 Pac. 1077 (1927)
(operating automobile without a license).
10The six" considerations listed are: a) pre-
sumptions based on the preponderance of proba-
bility; b) presumptions created to alleviate the
difficulty in securing legally competent evidence in
some cases; c) presumptions which owe their origin
to the fact that one party has peculiar means of
access to evidence or has peculiar knowledge of the
facts; d) presumptions created to express a socially
desirable result; e) presumptions which are neces-
sary .to avoid a procedural impasse; and f) pre-
suimltions designed to expedite the trial by relieving
a party, from introducing evidence upon issues
which may not be litigated. Morgan, Presumptions,
12 WAsa. L,:REv. 225,,257 (1937).
-Mosf writers follow some such classification as
this, but many group two or three of the above into
one category. In this article b) and c) will be
considered as one unit entitled comparative con-
vepience of evidence production. While the type of
erally recognized presumptions are supported
by two or more of the six. The first critical
issue in determining whether a rebuttable
presumption of law existed in the Hildebrandt
case is, therefore, whether an inference of op-
eration arises as a reasonable probability from
proof of ownership. The majority answered this
question negatively, pointing out that there are
considerably more driver's licenses issued than
automobile registrations; that cars are fre-
quently driven by persons other than the
owner; that many persons own more than one
car; and that some owners are not licensed
operators. Although the dissent agreed with
these conclusions, they felt that other consid-
erations outweighed those advanced by the
majority, and would have adopted this pre-
sumption of operation as a rule of evidence.
The dissent argued that the possibility that the
owner is not always the one driving his car does
not, ipso facto, invalidate the inference. "The
basic test is whether common experience sup-
ports the probability, not the certainty, that, if
the first fact is true, the second is also true."'"
The conclusion of the dissent that the inference
of operation was permissible is persuasive in
the light of the established rule that a jury may
infer from one fact the existence of another, if
the inference is supported by reason and experi-
ence.
32
presumption contemplated by Morgan under d)
was of the type which presumes that the possessor
of real estate holds under a lost grant when he has
possessed the land for a long and continuous
period as if he were the true owner, it is submitted
that a presumption which has been raised by some
of the other factors could be at least supported by
this consideration if the use of the presumption
would serve the public interest. Also, considerations
e) and f) are ignored here as having no bearing on
the problem.
31308 N.Y. at 404, 126 N.E.2d at 381.
This natural and rational connection requirement
is the basic test for constitutionality and is well
recognized. For a leading case upholding this rule
see Tot v. United States, 319 U.S. 463, 467 (1943).
* In the Tot case, supra note 30, the Court said
that an indictment merely charges the defendant
with an offense; it does not constitute proof of the
commission of the offense. The prosecution is
1956] ,
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The mere fact, however, that a logical infer-
ence can be supported in this case does not
compel the conclusion that a valid presumption
of law was established, nor would it necessarily
shift the burden of production of evidence" to
the defendant in the instant case. It is difficult
to declare any definite standard as to when the
production burden shifts to the accused. Pro-
fessor Morgan has enumerated four a priori
required to present proof of some sort. Although
such proof may consist of testimony of witnesses to
the offense, the fact that the Government may be
unable to produce eye witnesses does not necessarily
mean that it cannot produce proof sufficient to
support a verdict. The jury may infer from one fact
the existence of another, if the inference is supported
by reason and experience. Courts often hold that
proof of the first fact furnishes a basis for inference
of the other. Id. at 466.
While it may be argued that such an inference
does not arise as a reasonable probability from proof
of ownership, it has frequently been held that the
relationship is natural and logical. See Bastian v.
Baltimore & O.R.R., 144 F.2d 120, 123 (3d Cir.
1944) ("... an owner is presumed to be in charge
of and have control over his property, even if that
property be a vehicle."); People v. Bigman, 38 Cal.
App. 2d Supp. 773, 777, 100 P.2d 370, 372 (App.
Div. 1940) ("Relationship between the registered
owner of an automobile and its operation is
natural"); People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 584,
282 N.W. 248, 253 (1938) (".... there is a rational
connection between the ownership of an auto-
mobile,..., and the actual use of the highways by
such owner in the operation and parking of his
automobile thereon.").
13 The "burden of proof" is generally recognized
as having two aspects: The burden of persuasion,
or, as more descriptively named by many legal
writers, the risk of non-persuasion; and the burden
of production of evidence, alternatively, the risk of
non-production.
The persuasion burden is that of convincing the
tribunal, either a jury or a judge sitting without a
jury, that the existence of the fact in question is
more probable than the non-existence of that fact.
See MODEL CODE OF EvmENcE, Rule 11, Comment
(1942).
The production burden is that of convincing the
judge that sufficient evidence as to the existence of
the fact in question has been produced to justify
submitting the question to the jury, and to sup-
port a finding that the fact does exist. Ibid.
tests for allocating the burden in civil cases.Y
These tests place the initial burden upon: (1)
the party having the affirmative of the issue;
(2) the party to whose case the fact in question
is essential; (3) the party who has the burden
of pleading it; or (4), the party having the
peculiar means of knowing the fact. In criminal
cases the first three tests are of doubtful value
inasmuch as the prosecution already has the
initial burden of proving guilt beyond a reason-
able doubt. However, the fourth test has been
applied in many criminal proceedings to shift
the production burden to the defendant. 35 A
frequently quoted standard for shifting the
production burden appears as dicta in Morrison
v. California6 where Mr. Justice Cardozo said:
"... [T]he state shall have proved enough
to make it just for the defendant to be re-
quired to repel what has been proved with
excuse or explanation, or at least that upon
a balancing of convenience of the oppor-
tunity for knowledge the shifting of the
burden will be found to be an aid to the
accuser without subjecting the accused to
hardship or oppression." 37
Interpreting Cardozo's words as meaning
that the burden of coming forward with the
evidence is shifted to the defendant when he has
a better opportunity for knowledge and when
this will aid the prosecution without subjecting
the accused to any hardship, it becomes appar-
m Morgan, Some Observations Concerning Pre-
sumptions, 44 HARv. L. REv. 906, 911 (1931).
11 United States v. Fleischman, 339 U.S. 349
(1950); Williams v. United States, 138 F.2d 81
(D.C. Cir. 1943); Williams v. District of Columbia,
65 A.2d 924 (D.C. Mun. App. 1949); State v.
Grieco, 184 Ore. 253, 195 P.2d 183 (1948).
36 291 U.S. 82 (1933).
17 Id. at 88.
However, does this language really prescribe a
standard for the shifting? It merely says that the
burden can be shifted, not when or under what
circumstances it will be shifted. It is submitted that
the correct interpretation, from its context in the
case and its use in subsequent cases, as a test should
be ".... that the state shall have proved enough to
make it just for the defendant to be required to repel
what has been proved with excuse or explanation,
wien, upon a balancing of convenience .... " If this
interpretation be adopted, a standard is provided.
[Vol. 47
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
ent that the burden of production could prop-
erly have been shifted to Hildebrandt. The
identity of the driver was peculiarly within the
owner's knowledge, and evidence that he was
not driving at the time the violation occurred
would rebut a presumption of operation. In
view of the fact that the defendant could have
accomplished this by producing others to tes-
tify, by offering other evidence, or by his testi-
fying himself,n3 such a requirement would not
subject him to any hardship or oppression.
Thus the Hildebrandt case contained both a
logical inference and a procedural necessity to
raise the presumption of law advocated by the
dissent.
The use of this presumption, raised by logic
and necessity, could find further support if it
would aid in reaching a result beneficial to the
public interest.P Speeders and the number of
accidents caused by them create a very grave
social problem and attempts to lessen this
problem would be frustrated by requiring chase
and capture to sustain each speeding convic-
tion. While it may be argued that it is more the
function of the police to patrol than to arrest,
as long as mechanical aids, such as the photo-
traffic camera here employed, have been
developed, it would be unwise to curtail their
use.4 Any possible way to control speeders and
abate the problem caused by them should not
be restricted unless offensive to our sense of
freedom and justice.4'
38 Since in many jurisdictions a harsher penalty is
imposed for each successive speeding violation
within a certain period, cross-examination of the
- accused, if he chose to testify himself, should be
limited to questions as to the particular offense
charged, thereby avoiding any objections of
compulsory self-incrimination.
9 See note 30 supra.
40 Furthermore, traffic laws are designed to
prevent injuries to person and property, and to
guard against accidents. State v. Swinney, 231 N.C.
506, 507, 57 S.E.2d 647 (1950).
41 Courts have frequently held that mechanical
aids, such as wiretapping, used to get a confession
or information concerning a crime are illegal. How-
ever, those cases are distinguishable from the
Hildebrandt case, in that the manner in which
the mechanical devices were used in those cases
The dissent also felt since the same considera-
tions giving rise to the presumption in Rubin
existed here-a logical inference and a procedu-
ral advantage-reinforced by the beneficial
effects, that stare decisis required a similar
result. As pointed out in the opinion of the
court, the current case is distinguishable from
the Rubin case on its facts--i.e., a "moving
violation" here as contrasted to a "standing
violation" in Rubin; however, the minority
argued that in principle and logic the two cases
could not be distinguished.4 To be consistent
with the Rubin case Hildebrandt's conviction
should have been sustained.
The ultimate question is whether the pre-
sumption relied upon by the prosecution proved
the defendant's operation of the vehicle, i.e.,
guilt, beyond a reasonable doubt. Since the
presumption of innocence is not evidence,43
but merely allocates the burden of proof,4 its
purpose has been fulfilled when the prosecution
has been required to produce evidence suffi-
ciently strong to justify shifting the production
burden onto the defendant. 45 Hence a trier of
fact should be free in such a case to determine
whether guilt has been established beyond
violated fundamental rights of the accused. The
use of the phototraffic camera in the Hildebrandt
case did not invade any of Hildebrandt's rights. The
only question here was whether the use of such
evidence sustained the prosecution's burden of
proof.
42 It should be pointed out that in both of these
cases the charge is aimed at the individual, rather
than at the individual in a speeding violation and
at the car in a parking violation. People v. Hilde-
brandt, 308 N.Y. 397, 404, 126 N.E.2d 377, 380 n.1
(1954).
13 See notes 8 and 9 supra.
44 State v. Hayes, 127 Conn. 543, 18 A.2d 895
(1941); McKibben v. State, 59 Ga. App. 345, 200
S.E. 314 (1939); Sayler v. Commonwealth, 264
Ky. 53, 94 S.W.2d 281 (1936); Carr v. State, 192
Miss. 152,4 S.2d 887 (1942); Morrison v. California,
291 U.S. 82, 88 (1933).
4- People v. Bigman, 38 Cal. App. 2d Supp. 773,
776, 100 P.2d 370, 373 (App. Dep't. 1940); People v.
Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 578, 282 N.W. 248, 250
(1950); State v. Giordano, 121 NJ.L. 469, 471,
3 A.2d 290, 291 (Sup. Ct. 1939); State v. Harris,
223 N.C. 697, 702, 28 S.E.2d 232, 237 (1944).
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reasonable doubt, once a valid presumption of
law has arisen.
It is doubtful whether the probability that
the owner was the driver, standing alone, would
be sufficiently persuasive to convince beyond a
reasonable doubt. Furthermore, such a proba-
bility should not arbitrarily be given the re-
quired weight merely as a procedural conveni-
ence or to reach a result beneficial to the public
interest." According to Professor Wigmore,
however, a presumption that the evidence was
unfavorable to the accused arises from the
failure of the accused to produce evidence.47
Thus the presumption of operation supported
by public interest and the failure of the defend-
ant to produce evidence should more than
satisfy the prosecution's burden of persuasion.
Of course, if there were a question of possible
prejudice to the accused, the rule advocated by
the minority should not be adopted. However,
any dangers which could develop if the use of
this presumption were expanded to include
every misdemeanor and felony committed in
the use of automobiles, do not seem as serious
as they might. A sufficient protection against
46 Some writers would hold that social and pro-
cedural benefits would add sufficient force to a
logical inference to overcome reasonable doubt.
Professor Bohien said "the whole force of the pre-
sumption is to make the legal concept of sufficient
proof conform to the popular concept by adding to
data, which complies with the popular standard of
adequate proof, that additional weight necessary to
satisfy the more exigent legal standard." Bohlen,
The Effect of Rebuttable Presumptions of Law Upon
the Burden of Proof, 68 U. PA. L. REv. 307, 317
(1920).
47 8 WiGmoRE, EVDENCE § 2273 (3d ed. 1940).
Wigmore further states that if a legitimate pre-
sumption is raised, which has sufficient strength to
create a duty for the accused to present some
evidence to the contrary, there is no reason why
the jury should not be directed to find according to
the presumption. 9 WIGMoRE, EVIDENCE § 2511
(3d ed. 1940). Wigmore was referring to civil
actions and since there can be no directed verdict
of guilty in a criminal trial, this principle would
have no application in criminal proceedings before
a jury. However, the judge, sitting without a jury,
should be permitted to find according to the pre-
sumption.
an innocent person's being wrongly convicted
lies in the fact that this is a rebuttable presump-
tion. It has earlier been pointed out the ease
with which the presumption can be rebutted.4
The court in the Hildebrandt case did not
discuss the constitutionality of the judicial pre-
sumption advocated by the minority. However,
it may be well to consider how a court might
rule if the legislature created a statutory
presumption of this type.49 To be held valid
41 A California court in a similar case pointed
out that the owner, if he were not the driver on a
given occasion, knew and could easily prove who
was driving. Peoplev. Bigman, 38 Cal. App. 2d Supp.
773, 777, 100 P.2d 370, 372 (App. Dep't. 1940).
Quaere: Would not much of the value of the
presumption be destroyed if it were too easily
rebutted? That is, if the presumption could be
rebutted merely by the accused's denying that he
was the driver or by his producing a witness who
mdrely denies that the defendant was driving, the
doorway to perjury would be opened, and the
prosecution might still be forced to make a full
investigation before it could obtain a conviction,
even though it had originally availed itself of the
presumption of operation. For a discussion of the
generally recognized views as to the quantum of
evidence necessary to rebut a presumption see
Morgan, How to Approach Burden of Proof and
Presumptions, 25 RocKY MT. L. REv. 34,45 (1952).
41 To date there has been very little legislation on
this question, but at least three states have statutes
to the effect that the license plate shall be prima
facie evidence that the owner was driving the car
at the time of a traffic violation. See note 19 supra.
These statutes and also similar city ordinances have
been held valid. City of Chicago v. Crane, 319 Ill.
App. 623, 49 N.E.2d 802 (1934); Commonwealth v.
Ober, 286 Mass. 25, 189 N.E. 601 (1934); People v.
Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248 (1938);
City of St. Louis v. Cook, 359 Mo. 270, 221 S.W.2d
468 (1949); Contra, Nasfell v. Ogden City, 249
P.2d 507 (Utah 1952).
A further indication that this type of pre-
sumption is not repugnant to the Federal or state
constitutions is that the majority of states, in-
ciuding New York, have long accepted the pre-
sumption in civil cases that a car involved in an
accident is presumed to have been in the possession
of the owner. Wilson v. Harrington, 269 App. Div.
891, 56 N.Y.S.2d 157 (3d Dep't. 1945) (presumption
rebutted); Christie v. B. F. Vineburg, Inc., 259
[Vol. -47
CRIMINAL LAW CASE NOTES AND COMMENTS
such a statute would have to satisfy the con-
stitutional requirement of trial by jury, the
guaranty of due process, and the protection
against compulsory self-incrimination, ° On the
issue of trial by jury, it suffices to say that the
presumption here involved would have no
effect whatever on that right. The due process
argument is that the statute is arbitrary or that
it operates to deny a fair opportunity to repel
the presumption.a These arguments can be
answered by pointing out that in the presump-
tion in question there is a natural and rational
relation between the fact proved and that pre-
sumedn and also that here the accused has
sufficient opportunity to repel the presumption.
The argument that a statute of this type is
violative of the constitutional protection
against compulsory self-incrimination poses a
more difficult problem. Within a period of two
years the Supreme Court of Michigan held one
city ordinance unconstitutional because it af-
forded no way to rebut the prima facie case
other than for the accused to testify,n and
another ordinance constitutional because it did
not require the owner of the vehicle to testify
under oath or submit to an examination as to
the identity of the person operating the car at
such time." In drafting a statute, care must be
taken that the accused is not restricted, in re-
App. Div. 342, 19 N.Y.S.2d 252 (1st Dep't. 1940);
Bennrona Corp. v. Mulroney, 254 App. Div. 630.,
3 N.Y.S.2d 87 (4th Dep't. 1938); Callahan v. State,
201 Misc. 378, 107 N.Y.S.2d 319 (Ct. Cl. 1951).
50 State v. Kelly, 218 Minn. 247, 257, 15 N.W.2d
554, 560 (1944).
It would appear that these same elements would
be demanded whether the presumption is created
legislatively or judicially.
51 Manley v. Georgia, 279 U.S. 1, 6 (1929).
2 Cases cited note 32 supra.
6 People v. Hoogy, 277 Mich. 578, 269 N.W. 605
(1936).
"People v. Kayne, 286 Mich. 571, 282 N.W. 248
(1938).
butting the prima fade case, to the single
method of testifying himself. If the statute
affords alternative methods, the complaint
that the presumption compels the accused to
be a witness against himself can be easily dis-
missed. The statute compels nothing.5"
Of course, before a statutory presumption
could be declared constitutional in New York,
the Court of Appeals may have to revise its
theory that there is no natural connection
between proof of ownership and the assumption
that the owner was driving.' If, in time, the
New York legislature does create this statutory
presumption and the courts adopt the position
urged by the minority in the Hildebrandt case,
will the results reached do violence to the im-
plicit constitutional provision that every ac-
cused is presumed innocent until proven
guilty? From the foregoing analysis, this
answer would be negative. The presumption of
innocence is a shield designed for protection of
the innocent; it is not a weapon to be wielded in
the hands of the guilty to frustrate the opera-
tion of law and to evade the penalties they
deserve6 7
"5 Accord, Yee Hem v. United States, 268 U.S.
178,185 (1925). The court there dismissed the
argument that the practical effect of the statute
creating the presumption was to compel the accused
to be a witness against himself, by saying that the
statute compeled nothing. The accused was entirely
free to testify or not, as he chose, and if he happened
to be the only repository of the facts necessary to
negative the presumption, that was a misfortune
which the statute did not create, but was inherent
in the case.
56 While the Court of Appeals in the Hildebrandt
case did not feel that there was a sufficient con-
nection on which to declare a judicial presumption,
they refused to pre-decide the question of how they
might rule if the legislature created a statutory
presumption. It is submitted that if the legislature
felt the need for such a presumption, the court would
not raise any constitutional objections.
67 State Board of Medical Examiners v.
McHenery, 69 S.2d 592, 596 (La. 1953).
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